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FRANCIS REXFORD COOLEY
FROM ISOLATIONISM TO INTERVENTIONISM 
IN MAINE, 1939-1941
In  1939, with world war looming in Europe, 
Maine 9s alFRepublican delegation in Congress remained 
predominantly isolationist, with Representative James 
C. Oliver the state ’s leading critic of pro-British interna­
tionalism. Over the course of a few months in 1941, the 
delegation made a remarkable turnabout, leaving Oliver 
to face the winds of political change. While the decisions 
made by the Maine delegates were shaped by unfolding 
events in Europe, they also reflected, as the author points 
out, the perception that preparedness would benefit 
Maine economically. Mr. Cooley is the Lecturer-in- 
Academic-Studies at Paier College of Art in Hamden, 
Connecticut, and teaches at Hebrew High School of New 
England in West Hartford.
Republican voters listening to the radio in early June  1942 
heard  congressional candidate Robert Hale ask "whether Maine 
wishes to be represented by, or can possibly afford to be 
represented by, an isolationist Congressm an.” The next day in 
the prim ary election, Republican voters answered by making 
Hale their nom inee, in a two-to-one victory over isolationist 
C ongressm anjam es C. Oliver.1 With America already involved 
in W orld W ar II, isolationism was a m oot point in Maine and 
elsewhere, but, in fact, Oliver’s political chances had been 
dashed well before the fateful bom bing o f Pearl H arbor in 
Decem ber 1941.
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James C. Oliver, elected to the House of Representatives in 1936, deplored the drift to 
internationalism as Congress debated the Neutrality Ac t and the administration’s cash- 
and-carry and Lend-lease programs. In the above photo, Oliver witnesses as Speaker of 
the House Bankhead swears Margaret Chase Smith into office on June 10, 1940. Photo 
courtesy North wood University Margaret Chase Smith Library. Skowhegan, Maine.
W here Oliver was the only isolationist in the Maine Septem ­
ber elections, others shared his views as late as 1941. In his 
analysis o f the Seventy-sixth Congress, I listorian David L. Porter 
identified M aine’s entire House delegation as isolationist in 
1939, with its senators voting in the m oderate isolationist cam p.2 
The situation changed rapidly in 1939-1941. When the Portland 
chapter o f the America First Com m ittee was formed in Septem ­
ber 1941, the Maine GOP, a source of strength for the com m ittee 
on the national level, reacted coolly/ This Republican position, 
form ulated in a few m onths during the fall o f 1941, indicated a 
profound and sudden political shift within the party. Why did
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M aine’s congressional delegation alter its perspectives on isola­
tionism, war, and  preparedness, leaving Oliver, the state’s lone 
isolationist, to w eather the consequences of the 1942 election?
During the sum m er o f 1939 Congress debated an arms 
em bargo to the belligerents, one o f a series o f neutrality acts 
passed in the 1930s. The debate raged as to how to am end the 
act in light o f the tense political situation in Europe. Porter notes 
that m ost H ouse Republicans were opposed to internationalism  
and preparedness program s in 1939. In the Senate, he argues, 
the New England Republican senators opposed com bining arms 
shipm ents with increased presidential authority.4 M aine’s all- 
Republican congressional delegation, com prised of Senators 
Wallace H. W hite and Frederick Hale and Representatives 
Oliver (South Portland), Clyde Smith (Skowhegan) and Ralph 
Owen Brewster (Dexter), fits P orter’s sketch of New England 
congressional Republicans. W hite and Hale entered the House 
and Senate in  1917; Oliver and Smith had been elected to 
Congress in 1936; and Brewster, a form er governor, entered 
Congress in 1935.5 In the Senate, W hite favored delaying the 
Neutrality Act revisions of 1939, explaining that he was “not 
willing to grant [additional] discretionary powers in this field to 
the President.”6
After the G erm an invasion of Poland and the declarations 
o f war in Europe, both  White and Hale steered a middle course 
between isolationist and internationalist am endm ents. Both, for 
instance, supported  Robert A. Taft’s am endm ent to the Neutral­
ity Act, which would have restricted public and private loans to 
belligerents. The am endm ent was defeated.7 Yet, both  Maine 
senators opposed three similarly isolationist am endm ents: one 
restricting the adm inistration’s cash-and-carry plan for aiding 
belligerents; ano ther restricting U.S. shipping to belligerents; 
and a third calling for a national advisory on war prior to 
deploym ent o f U.S. troops outside the Americas.8 O n some 
issues the senators split their vote. Hale supported a repeal o f the 
arms em bargo, his sympathies clearly resting with England and 
France, and by late O ctober he was opposed the Neutrality Act 
altogether.9 W hite, on the other hand, opposed the president’s
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“cash-and-carry” arms proposal for Britain; to him, cash-and- 
carry violated American neutrality.10
The Maine House delegation displayed firm er isolationist 
views in 1939, with Oliver representing the m ost vehem ent stand 
against U.S. involvement.11 N either Brewster nor Smith adopted 
the Anglophobic rhetoric employed by Oliver, who relied heavily 
on historian Charles A. Beard’s “Devil Theory of W ar” in his 
support of the Neutrality Act. The proposed am endm ents, 
Oliver reproached, am ounted to “an un-American 10 Downing 
Street bill.”12 Newspaper headlines suggest the extent of Oliver’s 
Anti-British rhetoric — “Bloom Bill A ttem pt to Lure U.S. Into 
British Treachery Says Oliver” — while the Smith and Brewster 
pronouncem ents captured the milder side of Republican isola­
tionism: “Existing Neutrality Is Favored by Smith, Declares U.S. 
Has No Excuse for Any Meddling in Foreign Affairs”; and 
“Bloom Neutrality Bill Attacked by Brewster as Leading Toward 
W ar.”13
During the November 1939 special session, the three Maine 
House delegates voted as a block on isolationist issues.14 Brewster, 
however, was already beginning to shift his position on strict 
isolation. He polled 8,000 Maine Republicans, providing argu­
m ents that both  supported the em bargo (Vandenberg R-MI), 
and advocated its repeal (Taft R-OH). A headline in the Press 
Herald reflected respondents’ position: “Maine For Arms Em­
bargo Repeal, Brewster Poll Reveals.” Later that day, Brewster 
revealed his own position. Proclaiming himself a “charter 
m em ber” of the Com mittee to Keep America O ut of Foreign 
Wars, he proposed that removing the arms em bargo from  the 
Neutrality Act would prevent U.S. involvement and shorten the 
war.15
A lthough Brewster did not announce his intention to run  for H ale’s seat in the 1940 election, it is clear that he hoped his position on neutrality would 
boost his political prospects. They did. The next day, the Press 
Herald endorsed Brewster, claiming that “inasmuch as Mr. 
Brewster is a candidate to succeed Mr. Hale, who insists upon  
retiring, it is evident that he, like the present senatorial incum-
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Although Representative Clyde Smith of Skowhegan eschewed Oliver's Anglophobic 
rhetoric, he voted with his colleague on isolationist issues. When Smith died in 1940, 
many expected his replacement, Margaret Chase Smith, to support his stand. 
Instead, she led the delegation in the shift to preparedness. Photo courtesy Northwood 
University Margaret Chase Smith Library, Skowhegan, Maine.
bent, would accurately represent Maine sentim ent and would 
make a worthy successor.” On November 3, the House and 
Senate voted to revise the Neutrality Act. Both Hale and 
Brewster voted for the repeal of the arms em bargo, while White, 
Smith, and Oliver voted against it.16
O pinion on isolationism began to shift in the Maine delega­
tion. In April 1940 Clyde Smith died, signaling a change in the
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com position o f the delegation. Sm ith’s wife, M argaret Chase 
Smith, was sworn in as his replacem ent.17 As huge military 
appropriations and Selective Serivce bills came before both 
houses of Congress that summer, the focus of debate shifted 
from  isolationism to preparedness; mem bers questioned the 
extent to which the U.S. should prepare for war — and did 
preparedness m ean that the nation would jo in  the war? Clyde 
Smith had firmly voted with Oliver on isolationist issues, and 
many expected M argaret Chase Smith to follow his lead.18 
However, Smith, like the rest o f the House delegation, endorsed 
the military appropriation bills, and she and Brewster voted for 
Selective Service.19 The split between Oliver and the other two 
representatives on Selective Service foreshadowed a rift over 
public support for Charles Lindbergh, America’s leading isola­
tionist. Smith and Brewster avoided association with L indbergh’s 
isolationist activities, while Oliver inserted an isolationist radio 
address delivered by Lindbergh into the Congressional Record.20
In the Septem ber general election, Brewster ran as the heir 
to Senator Hale. The Bangor Daily News endorsed him, reprin t­
ing a Press Herald editorial titled “Ralph Owen Brewster: The 
Voice of Maine to the N ation.” Brewster, it recounted, voted 
"with M aine’s senior senator, who himself knew accurately...the 
sentim ent of his state.”21 H ale’s support for supplying the British 
with war materials was well known, and by 1940 White supported 
British aid as well. Aside from  Oliver, the voting patterns of 
M aine’s congressional delegation were beginning to converge.22
T he adm inistration’s decision to sell fifty destroyers to G reat Britain purposely side-stepped congres­sional action in order to avoid isolationist filibuster­
ing.23 A lthough the Maine congressional delegation rem ained 
quiet on the destroyer deal, Maine newspapers did not. Most, in 
fact, praised Roosevelt’s decisions. The Maine State Labor News 
advocated “dispatching some age-outclassed bu t serviceable 
destroyers’7 to G reat Britain, and the Bath Times p ro tested  the 
governm ent’s slow m ovem ent on shipbuilding contracts and 
plant conversions.24 The Press Herald, which com plim ented 
Roosevelt’s policy bu t not his m ethod of im plem entation, ques-
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Testing the wind with a poll of 8,000 Maine Republicans in fall 1939, 
Representative Ralph Owen Brewster announced his support for 
arms shipments to Great Britain. In 1940 he ran for the retiring 
Frederick Hale’s Senate scat, gaining endorsements from the Portland 
Press Herald and the Bangor Daily AVti»s. Photo courtesy Spa ial Collet tions 
Department. Fogter Library, University oj Maine.
tionecl “just how far Mr. Roosevelt intends to go towards war 
under the terms o f our ‘Neutrality’ Act?”-5
The adm inistration’s precipitous action on the destroyer 
deal propelled the America First Com m ittee onto the national 
political landscape. Since the majority o f America First members 
were Republicans, the Republican sweep o f the Maine elections 
in Septem ber 1940 should have provided grounds for vigorous
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organizing in the state. But in fact, Maine was not able to m uster 
a state chapter until Septem ber 1941.26 As the Brewster poll had 
shown, Maine Republicans were not necessarily isolationists.
The year 1941 proved unkind both  to America First in 
Maine and to Jam es Oliver, their biggest booster. Roosevelt, in 
his State of the Union address, asked Congress for a Lend-lease 
program  to help supply G reat Britain with war materials. Maine 
newspapers generally supported the president’s plan, bu t debate 
raged in the letters-to-the-editor columns.27 O ne Press Herald 
reader asked if “the cause of ‘America First’....[was] to be 
superseded by ‘Defend the British Em pire’ at all costs?” A nother 
considered the Americans “suckers’7 for wanting to give loans to 
G reat Britain, since the Allies still owed the U.S. for W orld War 
I debts. A nother reader endorsed Lend-lease, claiming that 
loans to China and G reat Britain would be a "good investment, 
even if unpaid .”28
The 77th Congress opened with some changes in the Maine 
congressional delegation. Brewster replaced Hale as Senator; 
Republican Frank Fellows of Bangor assumed Brewster’s old 
seat, and M argaret Chase Smith was elected to a term  in her own 
right.29 In March the president’s Lend-lease proposal came 
before the House as part of a larger national defense bill. 
A lthough many expected her to oppose it, Smith supported the 
Lend-lease proposal, and although at first both  Oliver and 
Fellows voted to sidetrack the bill, Fellows later sided with 
Smith.30 In fact, Fellows developed a pattern  of ambivalence on 
preparedness. Initially he voted against the appropriations bill 
because he, like Oliver, favored cutting defense spending out­
side the U nited States. W hen Smith endorsed the bill, however, 
Fellows voted with Smith.31 By 1941 Oliver’s isolationist stand, 
once the majority opinion in the Maine delegation, was an 
albatross around the congressm an’s neck. His increasingly 
unpopular stand did not go unnoticed in the press.32
Congressional impressions o f Roosevelt’s State of the Union 
Address made front-page headlines in the Press Herald. While 
W hite agreed with sending materials to G reat Britain, he stressed 
that the U nited States was obliged to m aintain its own freedom
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Senator Wallace White initially opposed the president’s cash-and-carry proposal, which 
he saw as a violation of American neutrality. Later he supported Lend-lease. Known as 
a staunch defender of the “freedom of the seas,” While argued that America could not 
“haul down the (lag from the ocean’s highways." Photo courtesy Northiuood University 
Margaret Chase Smith Library, Skowhegan, Maine.
before that o f o ther countries. Oliver condem ned the address, 
claiming that “the President anticipates and is the forerunner of 
military dictatorship in America.”11 Oliver did not stop at verbal 
attacks; he used his franking privilege to make reprints of
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Lindbergh’s testimony on lend-lease for the America First Com­
m ittee.34 Syndicated columnist May Craig, a strong supporter of 
Roosevelt’s policy, questioned the propriety of Oliver’s franking 
privileges, and the Press Herald chastised Oliver for obstructing 
lend-lease.35 Maine editorial opinion was increasingly critical of 
isolationism. Augusta’s KennebecJournal blasted L indbergh and 
the “anti-interventionists,” likening the popular A m erican 
aviationist to Prim e Minister Chamberlain at M unich.36
A ssessing the European situation and the swinging m ood am ong the Maine electorate, White endorsed Lend-lease in spring 1941, claiming that the Ameri­
can people wanted to "render effective aid to England in her 
m em orable struggle for life.”37 He perceived the paradox 
surrounding the situation: aid to Britain could drag the United 
States into the war, but imperiling the British by rem aining aloof 
would be a “disaster to the W orld of Free m en.” In this delicate 
situation, he thought, Congress should move ahead with aid to 
Britain, but rem ain wary o f delegating too much power to the 
president.38 W hite supported Lend-lease with the following 
stipulations: the United States would provide the war materials, 
bu t only Congress could authorize the transfers, and a time limit 
should be placed on the president’s new authority.39 In the 
balance lay W hite’s recognition that “totalitarian victory with all 
its threats and all its evil” was America’s greatest threat. O n 
March 8, 1941, he and Brewster voted to pass Roosevelt’s lend- 
lease program .40
Oliver, on  the other hand, argued vehemently against Lend- 
lease, calling the bill an attem pt to “liquidate the world unem ­
ploym ent through war and its mass em ploym ent o f hum an 
cannon fodder.” As a constraint on the president, he introduced 
a resolution m andating a referendum  on peace and war. En­
dorsed by America First, it nevertheless died in com m ittee.41
By Septem ber the Maine congressional delegation’s posi­
tions were clear to the public at large. Smith and W hite 
advocated aid to G reat Britain and the Allies, stoppingjust short 
o f war. Brewster, too, supported Britain, bu t cautioned against 
involving the U nited States in a shooting war which it was not
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prepared  to fight. Oliver wanted no part o f the war and no part 
o f Britain.42
In this shifting political environm ent America First opened 
its first Maine chapter in Septem ber 1941. Almost immediately 
the organization was attacked in the Maine press.43 Two prom i­
nen t Portlanders, reported  earlier as m embers o f the chapter, 
publicly rebuffed the group, leading the Press Herald to editori­
alize that the organization had gotten “off on the wrong foot.” 
O n the same page the Press Herald stated that “the times tran­
scend politics, and the quicker Republicans recognize this fact, 
as have most o f M aine’s Republican congressional delegation, 
the m ore favor they will find with the electorate.”44
The debate between interventionists and isolationists domi­
nated Maine politics in the fall of 1941. The Press Herald accused 
Charles Parsons, America First m em ber and part-time coastal 
resident, o f having tenuous standing as a “Maine M an” and 
harboring “allegedly Pacifist views.” Parsons replied by defend­
ing him self as a tax-payer and a candidate for officer training 
camp in M aine.45 The paper also called for the form ation of a 
th ird  party — the America First Peace Party — to draw off the 
m alcontents from  the two m ajor parties. The editor realized, 
however, that the issue would come to a “head” before the 1942 
election.46
Oliver, linked firmly in the minds of most Mainers with 
America First and  Charles Lindbergh, was criticized as well. A 
letter to the Press Herald signed “taxpayer" attacked his isolation­
ist position, noting the defense-related industry in his own 
district, which included Bath Iron Works, the South Portland 
Shipyards, and several military installations.47 Letters against 
Oliver’s position outnum bered  those supporting him, making 
the situation as clear as it was politically ominous. Maine 
Republicans were abandoning their lone isolationist representa­
tive in the m onths before Pearl H arbor.48
America First and its cause became a m oot poin t after 
Decem ber 7, 1941, and Robert H ale’s crushing victory over 
Oliver in the Ju n e  1942 Republican prim ary brought an end to 
the issue of isolationism in Maine.49 But the real sea-change in
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Maine public opinion came before Pearl H arbor. The first 
m onths of 1941 saw im portant precursors to the war m ood that 
swept the nation that December.
W ayne S. Cole pointed out in his Roosevelt and Isolationists, 1932-1945 that a split occurred in the isolationist votingblock as early as the Vinson- 
Tram m el bill o f 1934, which provided for an expanded Navy. 
Those representatives from  coastal and industrial areas sup­
ported  the bill, while those from  agrarian areas opposed it.50 As 
a coastal state, Maine derived vast economic benefit from naval 
appropriations like these.51 M aine’s Bath Iron Works (BIW) was 
in a superb position to bid on new naval contracts, and the 
outbreak o f war in Europe in 1939 only increased the dem and 
for its destroyers. BIW welcomed the new defense contracts, 
especially since the m arket for yachts — the shipyard’s other 
primary business — had collapsed during the Depression.52 The 
Bath Times heralded the awarding of eleven new destroyer 
contracts on its front page in Septem ber 1940. The story also 
noted the Portsm outh yards received six new subm arine con­
tracts, which benefited the Kittery area.53
Since 1937 the idea of a basin shipyard in South Portland 
had been discussed at Bath Iron Works. Originally planned for 
“super battleships,” the yard was build in 1940 to produce large 
standardized m erchant ships for the British to use in ferrying war 
materials across the Atlantic. BIW joined a syndicate with Todd 
Shipyards at its head and laid South Portland’s first keel in 
August 1941, reaping direct economic benefits from Roosevelt’s 
pro-British policy.54
The increase in defense-building benefited other Maine 
industries as well. The state received $5 million for airport 
construction, from  which the Bangor Air Corps Station was 
designed as the N ortheast’s primary defense airport.55 Addition­
ally, governm ent procured fishing vessels helped to boost the 
business o f small shipyards in Maine and the state’s fishing 
industry benefited from  the dem and for canned food on the 
European fron t.56 During the 1939 special session, Wallace 
White, known as a staunch defender of Am erica’s “freedom  of
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The state had much to gain from preparedness. Bath Iron Works was in a superb position 
to bid on new naval contracts, and Maine received $5 million for airport construction, 
from which the Bangor Air Corps Station was designed as the Northeast's primary 
defense airport. Top photo: Bath Iron Works, THE PLANT AND OPERATIONS OF BATH 
IRON WORKS, n.d.,; bottom photo:James B. Vickery, Jr., AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF 
THE CITY OF BANGOR, MAINE (1969).
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the seas,” proposed am endm ents to the Neutrality Act to allow 
fishing vessels and traders to use the Gulf of Maine to reach to 
Canadian fishing grounds. The nation, he argued, should not 
“haul...down the flag from  the ocean’s highways.”57
G eography represented another factor in M aine’s move away from  isolationism well before Pearl H arbor. The Nazi siege of Great Britain accented 
M aine’s vulnerability as Am erica’s Atlantic outpost. Most o f the 
congressional delegation realized the concerns that M aine’s 
Atlantic location raised with their constituents. Brewster high­
lighted M aine’s proximity to Europe in campaigning for an air 
base in 1940, and the Bath Times pointed out that “if a foreign 
power attem pted to invade this country, Maine would be...first 
subject to attack.”58 M aine’s proximity to Europe also high­
lighted the threat o f sabotage. The Maine State Labor News 
reported  fifth-column menaces as early as July 1940, while the 
Kennebec Journal p rin ted rum ors o f gasoline-filled fire extin­
guishers at Bath Iron Works.59 May Craig, in her “Inside Wash­
ington” column, pointed out that “M aine’s exposed position on 
the northeast corner probably has som ething to do with this 
desire to keep the battlefront in the British Isles and not this side 
of the Atlantic.”60 The “enem y” was indeed close at hand.
Given the economic benefits of preparedness and M aine’s 
geographical vulnerability, the state’s Republican delegation 
moved rapidly from  isolationism to interventionism  between 
1939 and fall 1941. By the time America First organized a 
chapter in Portland in Septem ber 1941, the Maine GOP, with the 
exception of Oliver, had abandoned M aine’s traditional staunch 
isolationist position. The large naval appropriation bill revived 
Bath Iron Works and the Portsm outh Shipyard and led to the 
creation o f the Todd-Bath yard. The expenditures on airport 
construction benefited Bangor and other communities, and the 
fishing and small-boat industries received a welcome boost from  
the war in Europe. While most Maine politicians responded to 
these incentives in the critical prewar months, one did not. 
Because of his steadfast attachm ent to isolationism, Jam es Oliver 
was easily defeated in a one-issue campaign in June 1942.
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